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Notes
JURISDICTION OF REFEREES IN BANKRUPTCY IN PLENARY ACTIONS
MacDonald v. Plymouth County Trust Company I is significant in its extension
of the jurisdiction of referees in bankruptcy. The trustee in bankruptcy filed
a petition with the referee to set aside certain transfers of property by the
bankrupt to a creditor as alleged preferences, voidable within the provisions
of section 60 (b) 2 of the Bankruptcy Act. The creditor appeared at the hear-
ing, denying the allegations of the petition, and consenting that the issues be
tried before the referee. The referee's decision being adverse, the creditor for
the first time challenged the referee's jurisdiction, claiming that the issues
thereby raised were properly determinable only in a plenary suit. The United
States Supreme Court admitted the plenary character of the suit, and the
existence of a privilege extended to the cfeditor by section 23(b) 3 to claim
the benefits of the procedure in a plenary suit which are not available in the
summary method of procedure employed by the referee. Nevertheless it was
held that in view of the negative implications in previous Supreme Court de-
cisions and the almost uniform practice of the lower federal courts, the privilege
could be waived by consent 4 similar to that manifested by the creditor in this
,ase.
1. 286 U. S. 263 (1932).
2. Bankruptcy Act, § 60 (b), 11 U. S. C. § 96 (b) (1926).
3. Bankruptcy Act; § 23 (b), 11 U. S. C. § 46 (b) (1926).
4. Page v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corporation, 286 U. S. 269 (1932), decided
on the same day, raises the question as to what type of conduct on the creditor's
part will be deemed to constitute "consent" within the rule in the principal case.
It was there held that the adverse claimant's voluntary presentation of its claim
to the referee for adjudication constituted the required consent. Two lower
federal courts had previously so held. In re Elletson Company, 174 Fed. 859
(N. D. W. Va. 1909); In re Carl Dernburg & Son, 5 F. (2d) 37 (C. C. A. 2d,
1924). Similarly, the adverse claimant's surrender of the property to the
trustee (Wells & Company v. Sharp, 208 Fed. 393 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913)) or his
failure to appeal from adverse orders entered by the referee (Breit v. Moore,
220 Fed. 97 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915)) or his general appearance and answer to
the merits without objection (In re Steuer 104 Fed. 976 (D. lass. 1900); In
re Schwab, 258 Fed. 772 (E. D. N. Y. 1919)) or an express waiver made in
open court (In re Carlile, 199 Fed. 612 (D. N. C. 1912)) have been held
sufficient. On the other hand, the filing of a petition with the referee for the
reclamation of property held by the bankrupt does not constitute consent as
to matters having no relation to the claim which the adverse claimant pre-
sented (Daniel v. Guaranty Trust Company, 285 U. S. 154 (1932); In re
Keystone Press, 203 Fed. 710 (D. Minn. 1913)); nor does the adverse claimant's
appearance in obedience to the referee's peremptory orders and in defense of
his claim, as long as he formally challenges the referee's jurisdiction before
the final order is entered. Louisville Trust Company v. Comingor, 184 U. S.
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A referee may determine in a summary proceeding all claims as to property
held by the bankrupt 5 or by a third party on behalf of the bankrupt 0 at the
time of the filing of the petition. But when the third party has obtained po3-
session prior to the filing of the petition, and claims the right to hold such
property as against the bankrupt or the trustee, the authority of the referee
in summary proceedings is restricted to determining whether the claim has
actual basis, or is merely colorable.7 If the referee's decision is that the claim
is without actual merit, he will regard the property as the property of the
bankrupt subject to his summary jurisdiction.8 But if his decision is that the
claim is in good faith, or of questionable faith but probably real, he must, on
objection of the creditor, remit the trustee to a plenary action.0 Such plenary
actions are limited by section 23(b)10 to such "courts" where the bankrupt
might have brought them had bankruptcy not been instituted "unless by con-
sent of the proposed defendant", while suits for the recovery of property under
sections 60(b),11 67(e)12 and 70 (e)13 are confined to any "court of banlruptcy
. . . and any state court which would have had jurisdiction if bankruptcy had
not intervened .... "
In deciding whether the referee may try the issues in a plenary suit when
the creditor consents thereto, the lower federal courts have not been wholly in
accord. A few have stated that the Act does not give the adverse claimant
the power to consent to summary proceedings because the only provision relative
to consent is section 23(b) which clearly refers to a consent to the tribunal
and not to the mode of procedure.14 A contrary interpretation, it is said, would
only deprive the adverse claimant of the ordinary rights of a litigant, such as
the right to a trial by jury. But it would seem that a consent to the tribunal,
in this ease the referee, necessarily involves a consent to the mode of procedure,
since the only method that is employed by the referee is summary. Moreover,
18 (1902); Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Company v. Fox, 264 U. S. 42G (1924);
of. First National Bank of Chicago v. Chicago Title & Trust Company, 198
U. S. 280 (1905).
5. White v- Schloerb, 178 U. S. 542 (1900); see Mueller v. Nugent, 184
U. S. 1, 13 (1902).
6. Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 1 (1924); Gamble v. Daniel, 39
F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930), appeal dismissed 281 U. S. 705 (1930).
7. See Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U. S. 191, 194 (1926); Mueller v.
Nugent, supra note 5, at 15. For instances where the referee exceeded this
authority, see In re Hayden, 172 Fed. 623 (D. Mass. 1908); In r Blum, 202
Fed. 883 (C. C. A. 7th, 1913); In re Vallozza, 225 Fed. 334 (D. N. J. 1915).
8. May v. Henderson, 268 U. S. 111 (1925); I2, re Holbrook Shoe & Leather
Company, 165 Fed. 973 (D. Mont. 1908); In re Friedman, 161 Fed. 260 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1908).
9. Weidhorn v. Levy, 253 U. S. 268 (1920); Louisville Trust Company v.
Comingor; Daniel v. Guaranty Trust Company, both supra note 4; Note (1921)
30 YAL L. J. 414.
10. Supra note 3.
11. Supra note 2.
12. Bankruptcy Act, § 67 (e), 11 U. S. C. § 107 (e) (1926).
13. Bankruptcy Act, § 70 (e), 11 U. S. C. § 110 (e) (1926).
14. See In re Teschmacher & Mrazay, 127 Fed. 728, 731 (E. D. Pa. 1904);
of. In re Raphael, 192 Fed. 874 (C. C. A. 7th, 1911); Kelley v. Aarons, 238
Fed. 996 (S. D. Cal. 1917).
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an adverse claimant would hardly be "deprived of a jury trial" when by his
conduct he has consented to that deprivation. Other courts have literally inter-
preted the Act to mean that the referee has no authority to act except in "pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy", which it is settled do not include plenary actions,
and that the term "courts" in section 23(b) does not include the referee, when
he is acting on a matter of which he is not expressly given jurisdiction by the
Act.15 Since the referee does not have jurisdiction, irrespective of consent,
these cases would deny him that jurisdiction even with consent, by reason of
the doctrine often appearing in diversity of citizenship cases that a court other-
wise without jurisdiction can not acquire jurisdicton by a mere agreement
of parties to that effect. 16
However, the great majority of the lower federal courts have upheld the
referee's jurisdiction, without question, when the parties have consented,17 fol-
lowing the implications of those Supreme Court decisions 18 which had pre-
viously held that the referee may not try the issues in a plenary suit "without
consent". This doctrine to which the Supreme Court has given its sanction in
the instant case, would seem the more desirable. On purely equitable considera-
tions, conduct similar to that of the creditor in the principal case in not raising
his objection until after referee had entered his final order, should be sufficient
to estop him from denying the referee's jurisdiction.19 Although he might have
been entitled to have his claim tried to a jury after the issues had been regu-
larly set up by complaint and answer in a plenary action, it would seem only
fair to hold that by his consent this privilege was waived, like any other pro-
cedural privilege extended for the benefit of litigants.20
Moreover, admitting the general doctrine that consent cannot confer juris-
diction, there would seem to be no reason for its application to controversies
arising under section 23(b). The term "courts" in section 23(b) may include
15. In re Walsh Brothers, 163 Fed. 352 (N. D. Iowa 1908); see In re Ballou,
215 Fed. 810, 814 (E. D. Ky. 1914).
16. See Minnesota v. Northern Securities Company, 194 U. S. 48, 62 (1004);
Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 195 U. S. 207, 211 (1904); Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy R. R. Company v. Willard, 220 U. S. 413, 420 (1911); of. Exporters
v. Butterworth-Judson Company, 258 U. S. 365 (1922); Nixon v. Michaols, 38
F. (2d) 420 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930).
17. In re Hopkins, 229 Fed. 378 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916) ; In e Elletson Company;
In re Carl Dernburg & Son; Wells & Company v. Sharp; Breit v. Moore; In
re Steuer; In re Schwab; In re Carlile, all supra note 4; see Knapp & Spencer
Company v. Drew, 160 Fed. 413, 416 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908); In ro Hanson, 208
Fed. 904, 905 (S. D. Cal. 1919); Foster v. Manufacturers' Finance Company,
22 F. (2d) 609, 610 (C. C. A. 1st, 1927); American Finance Company v. Cop-
pard, 45 F. (2d) 154, 155 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930).
18. See Louisville Trust Company v. Comingor, supra note 4, at 26; Taubel-
Scott-Kitzmiller Company v. Fox, supra note 4, at 434; Harrison v. Chamberlin,
supra note 7, at 193; Daniel v. Guaranty Trust Company, supra note 4, at 162.
19. In re Hopkins; Knapp & Spencer Company v. Drew, both supra note 17;
In re Schwab; In re Steuer, both supra note 4. But of. In re Walsh Brothers,
supra note 15.
20. See Harrison v. Chamberlin, supra note 7, at 193; Taubel-Scott-Kitz-
miller Company v. Fox, supra note 4, at 434; of. Patton v. United States, 281
U. S. 276 (1930).
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the referee, as section 1(7)21 expressly so permits. Section 38(4),22 defining
the referee's jurisdiction, contemplates that referees may be invested with the
powers of courts of bankruptcy except as to questions relating to compositions
and discharges; and although the Supreme Court once stated that the referee
is not to be regarded as a separate "court" within the meaning of section 23(b),
but only an officer having no powers except those conferred by the reference,2s
that statement -was limited to the particular situation wherein the creditor did
not consent to the referee's jurisdiction. Furthermore, General Order XII (1)2-
provides that upon reference all proceedings are to be had before the referee,
except such as are specifically required to be had before a Judge.25 These pro-
visions, under the liberal interpretation of the Supreme Court in the instant
ease, would seem to compel the conclusion that the term "courts" in section
23(b) and the term "courts of bankruptcy" in section 60(b), 67(e), and 70(e),
include the referee so as to vest in him the power to try the issues in a plenary
suit when the parties consent thereto.
THE FAD=Y PARTNERSHIP AS A DVICn FOR AVOIDING THE SURTAX
A TAXPAYER agreed to transfer one quarter of all he owned to each of his
three daughters on receipt of her demand note for $400,000. Under the terms
of the agreement the father retained complete control of the business and was
to distribute the profits as he saw fit, but the daughters might examine the
books and if they became dissatisfied with their father's management, he was
to give back their notes and take over their interests. The Circuit Court of
Appeals found that a partnership existed and held that the taxpayer was
taxable only on his distributive share of the partnership profits.1
The principal case is an excellent example of the formation of a family
partnership resulting in a reduction in the surtax which would otherwise be
imposed on the income as a vhole. 2 The courts have shown a marked tendency
to recognize the existence of such a partnership 3 and their findings have over-
21. Bankruptcy Act, § 1 (7), 11 U. S. C. § 1 (7) (1926). Compare the re-
port of the Committee on Legislation, submitted to the recent Conference of the
National Association of Referees in Bankruptcy, which approves amending § 1
(7) of the Act to read, "'court' shall mean the judge or the roftrce of the court
of bankruptcy . . ." (1932) 7 Joun. NAT'L AsS'N REFREES IN Bnrnupr Y 3.
22. Bankruptcy Act, § 38 (4), 11 U. S. C. § 66 (4) (1926).
23. Weidhorn v. Levy, supra note 9.
24. General Order XII (1), 11 U. S. C. § 53 (1926).
25. As to the effect of a general reference on the referee's powers, see
STAPLES, A SuIT IN BANKRUPTCY (1909) 102-109; and compare Kilgore v.
Barr, 114 Va. 70, 75 S. E. 762 (1912).
1. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Olds, 60 F. (2d) 252 (C. C. A. 6th,
1932).
2. The REVENUE ACT OF 1932, § 182, provides that each member of a partner-
ship shall be taxable only in his distributive share of the partnership income.
3. Cf. the refusal of the courts to permit a husband and wife to file separate
tax returns under agreements for the assignment of future income. Lucas v.
Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930); Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U. S. 136 (1932); Luce v.
Burnet, 55 F. (2d) 751 (App. D. C. 1932).
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ruled the opinion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in a large majority
of cases.4 But, it is difficult to discover any rationale as to the determining
factors in the decisions involving family partnership since those elements which
the courts have apparently used as criteria in finding a partnership, are like-
wise present when a partnership has been held not to exist.
,Among these factors, the exercise of joint control over the business by the
members might have been considered a critical point, but actually in many
instances where the agreement constituted a partnership it expressly provided
for control by a single member,5 and in only one case did this result In the
denial of the partnership.G Nor is the fact that the family members received
their interests in return for a contribution of services or capital a conclusive
index to the existence of a partnership; 7 and in many instances co-ownership
resulting in a partnership was accomplished by means of a gift to the wife
or children.8 Likewise, the questions whether the names of all the parties
were carried on the firm's books,9 whether the business was conducted solely
in the taxpayer's name,10 and whether the community in general know of the
existence of the partnership 11 might be considered significant, but these factors
bear no apparent relation to the courts' findings. Only two indicia appear con-
sistently throughout the cases-the sharing of profits and the sharing of losses,
Of these, the former is indecisive of the outcome because a provision for profit-
4. In thirty-nine out of fifty-one cases where the Commissioner found that
no partnership existed the Board of Tax Appeals held that the petitioner was
taxable only on his share of the profits.
5. Cobb v. Commissioner, 9 B. T. A. 547 (1927); Kahn v. Commissioner,
14 B. T. A. 125 (1928); MacPherson v. Commissioner, 19 B. T. A. 651 (1930).
6. Tally v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 712 (1931) (where petitioner was made
"absolute dictator" of the management of the business).
7. In several instances no partnership was formed in spite of such contri-
bution. Felton v. Commissioner, 18 B. T. A. 63 (1929) (services contributed);
Coombs v. Commissioner, 20 B. T. A. 1021 (1930) (capital and services con-
tributed); Buchanan v. Commissioner, 20 B. T. A. 210 (1930); S. M. 4271,
IV-2 Cum. Bull. 58 (capital contributed). But, the additional credit which
the wife's capital brought to the firm influenced the court to find a partnership
in. some instances. Pugh v. United States, 48 F. (2d) 600 (S. D. W. Va. 1931);
Virden v, Commissioner, 6 B. T. A. 1123 (1927).
8. Phelps v. Commissioner, 13 B. T. A. 1248 (1928); Harrington v. Com-
missioner, 21 B. T. A. 260 (1930). In fifteen cases where a partnership was
formed the family members received their interests as gifts.
9. Partnership formed: Peters v. Commissioner, 16 B. T. A. 895 (1929) (all
names on books); Newell v. Commissioner, 17 B. T. A. 93 (1929) (only peti-
tioner's name on books). Partnership not formed: Goldenberg v. Commissioner,
5 B. T. A. 213 (1926) (only petitioner's name on books); Robertson v. Com-
missioner, 20 B. T. A. 112 (1930) (all names on books).
10. Partnership formed: Virden v. Commissioner, supra. note 7 (business
done jointly); Gunderson v. Commissioner, 23 B. T. A. 45 (1931) (business done
in petitioner's name). Partnership not formed: Felton v. Commissioner, supra
note 7 (business done in petitioner's name).
11. Partnership formed: McKnight v. Commissioner, 13 B. T. A. 885 (1928)
(knowledge in 'community); Appeal of Bartley, 4 B. T. A. 874 (1926) (not
generally known). Partnership not formed: Hamerslag v. Commissioner, 15
B. T. A. 96 (1929) (not known to community).
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sharing was evident in many agreements where no partnership was formed.12
The latter, however, has appeared only in agreements which the courts have
considered as forming a partnership, 13 and may therefore be considered as of
greater weight than the other factors as a determinant. Perhaps the cause,
and certainly the result, of this confusion is the 'exercise of a discretionary
judgment by the courts on the facts of the individual case.
But even if it were possible to establish accurate criteria for the eistence
of a family partnership, realistically the change in status which the parties
undergo in entering the agreement seems too slight to warrant a different method
of taxation. In the first place, when the parties are members of the same family,
it is difficult to discover any material diminution in the income of a husband
or father who may, without invalidating the partnership, stipulate for the con-
trol of the distribution of the profits.14 Furthermore, it is not likely that the
taxpayer who admits members of his family to partnership actually relinquishes
any control of the business, whether or not the agreement provides that he is
to retain his previous authority. Finally, his wife or children incur little risk
under a provision to share losses since they are generally without assets, although
occasionally a wife may have a separate estate which partnership creditors
might reach.15
Thus the family partnership permits an individual to reduce his income tax
with little chance of detriment to himself or his "partners." In this he is aided
by the courts' attitude that a partnership will not be invalid because its purpose
is to evade the surtax.'6 However, one result is the unwarranted disparity in
the operation of the income tax statutes upon the individuals who avail them-
selves of the device, and its operation upon those who do not. From the point
of view of equitable tax administration, such inequality is clearly undesirable.
The taxation of the family income as a unit has been suggested as a remedy for
this lack of uniformity1 7 and pending a change in the Revenue Act a more
realistic determination of the existence of a family partnership might be had
by vesting a greater discretion in the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.1 8
12, Lidov v. Commissioner, 16 B. T. A. 1421 (1929) (no partnership as to
children); Wickham v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 1393 (1931); Kasch v. Com-
missioner, 25 B. T. A. 284 (1932).
13. Graham v. United States, 44 F. (2d) 566, (C. C. A. '7th, 1930); Golden-
berg v. Commissioner, supra note 9; Robertson v. Commissioner, sapra note 9.
14. Oaldey v. Commissioner, 24 B. T. A. 1082 (1931); Commissioner v. Olds,
supra note 1.
15. Pugh v. United States, supra note 7; Harrington v. Commissioner, mipra
note 8. Furthermore the formation of a partnership may deprive a husband
of the possibility of transferring his assets to his wife's name in contemplation
of bankruptcy.
16. Phelps v. Commissioner, supra note 8; see Mitchell v. Commissioner,
1 B. T. A. 143, 149 (1924).
17. Bruton, The Taxation of Family Income (1932) 41 YA= L. J. 1172.
18. It is significant that in several instances the Commissioner did not
acquiesce in the finding of the Board of Tax Appeals that a partnership existed.
Sunlin, 6 B. T. A. 1232 (1927), Non-acq. VII-1 Cum. Bull. 40; Reeb, 8 B. T. A.
759 (1927), Non-acq. X-1 Cum. Bull. 90; Wilson, 11 B. T. A. 963 (1928), Non-
acq. VMII-2 Cum. Bull 73; Biggs, 15 B. T. A. 1092 (1929), Non-acq. VIII-




PowER OF ASSIGNEE OF DEFAULTING PURCHASER AT JUDICIAL SALE
TO COiPEL VENDOR TO PERFORM
A CORPORATION'S bid for land at a judicial sale was accepted by the referee,
the corporation paying ten percent of the amount of its bid. On the day fixed
for the closing of the sale, the vendee refused to complete its bid on the alleged
ground that title to the premises was defective. After two years of litigation,
the title was adjudged marketable, and the vendee directed to complete the
sale.' Upon its failure to comply, the vendors obtained a court order for a
resale which provided that the vendee be charged with any resulting deficiency.2
Thereafter the vendee assigned the bid, and the assignees, in order to secure
the benefit of an increase in the value of the land, made application for an
order directing the referee to complete the original sale. The New York Court
of Appeals, three judges dissenting, declared that the purchaser's default re-
leased the vendors from their duty to convey, and that in any event, relief
could not be granted to the assignees who had assumed no obligation under the
assignment.3
It is well established that the confirmation of a judicial sale vests an equitable
estate in the purchaser, and impresses a trust upon the legal title retained by
the vendor as security for the payment of the purchase price.4 In such case
a failure on the part of the purchaser to complete his bid empowers the vendor
to enforce a lien upon the land for the balance of the purchase price,0 under
a court order for a resale. This is not considered a rescission of the contract,
and the land is resold as the property of the vendee who, while charged with
the amount of a deficiency,7 is entitled to a resulting surplus.3 Consequently,
it has been held that at any time prior to the actual resale, the defaulting pur-
chaser may step in and complete the terms of the bid, and that a previous
1. Bowen v. Poole, 255 N. Y. 615, 175 N. E. 337 (1931).
2. This order, while not acted upon, was never vacated or modified.
3. Bowen v. Horgan, 259 N. Y. 267, 181 N. E. 567 (1932).
4. In re Burr Mfg. & Supply Co., 217 Fed. 16 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914); Royal
Insurance Co. v. Drury, 150 Md. 211, 132 Atl. 635 (1920); Matter of Super-
intendent of Banks, 207 N. Y. 11, 100 N. E. 428 (1912); Hurt v. Jones, 75 Va.
341 (1881). Contra: Garlington v. Copeland, 32 S. C. 57, 10 S. E. 616 (1890).
See 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JuRisPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) §§ 105, 368; 3 id. §§
1046, 1161.
5. Lewis v. Hawkins, 90 U. S. 119 (1874) ; see Hurt v. Jones, supra note 4,
at 346; Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cottrell, 85 Va. 857, 861, 9 S. E. 132,
133 (1889); 1 POMEROY, Zoc. cit. supra note 2.
6. Ludwig's Estate, 74 Pa. Super. Ct. 259 (1920); Hurt v. Jones, supra
note 4; Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cottrell, supra note 5; see Banes
v. Gordon, 9 Pa. 426, 427 (1848).
7. Camden v. Mayhew, 129 U. S. 73 (1889); Mariners Savings Bank v. Duca,
98 Conn. 147, 118 Atl. 820 (1922). See also infra note 8.
8. Aukam v. Zantzinger, 94 Md. 421, 51 Atl. 93 (1902); Hurt v. Jones, supra
note 4; Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cottrell, supra note 5; see Blakeley's
Adm'x v. Hughes, 140 Ky. 174, 176, 130 S. W. 1067, 1068, (1910); 3 JONES,
MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 2109. Contra: Chdse v. Joiner, 88 Tenn. 161, 14
S. W. 331 (1890).
9. Robertson v. Skelton, 13 Beav. 91 (Eng. 1850); Denison v. Denison, 4 Chan.
Chain. 37 (Ont. Can. 1872); cf. Billingslea v. Baldwin, 23 Md. 85 (1865) (where
there had been a ratification nisi).
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repudiation -would constitute no bar to a later suit for specific performance.20
The assignee of the bid would succeed by virtue of the assignment to the rights
of the original vendee as equitable owner of the subject of the sale, and to the
equitable renoedies essential to their enforcement.'1 The view of the court that
a lack of mutuality of remedy would bar the assignee from enforcing the con-
tract'. 2 has been expressly repudiated in its own jurisdiction,23 and has in
general been so qualified by exceptions that it has lost its validity as a rule
of law.' 4 Moreover, the assignees by the very act of invoking the aid of equity
assumed the duty of performance, and subjected themselves to whatever con-
ditions the judgment entailed.15
The theory that an equitable estate is vested in the vendee under an executory
contract for the sale of land originated as a rationalization of the remedy of
specific performance in actions by a purchaser against a defaulting vendor. 0
A different situation is obviously presented where the purchaser after his own
breach and an order for a resale finds it to his advantage to compel the com-
pletion of the original sale. Yet in the few cases in which this situation has
arisen, courts have followed the logical implications of the concept of equitable
title, and have permitted a recovery by the vendee. 17 The dissent in the instant
case adopted this approach; it was argued that since an equitable title passed
to the vendee, an order for a resale must be a direction to sell that title and
an affirmance of the original contract of sale. The majority escaped this con-
clusion by omitting all reference to "equitable title." It declared instead that
the purchaser's default had been final and complete, and that the order for a
resale was merely an attempt on the part of the vendors to secure reimbursement
for any consequent loss. This effort, the court concluded, the vendors should
"in all fairness be permitted to abandon" if they saw fit. The force of this
conclusion, however, is unfortunately impaired by the court's reliance on the
theory that there was no mutuality of obligation between assignee and vendor,
and its qualifying statement that the original purchaser might have been suc-
cessful in the prosecution of the claim.
10. Cf. Barton v. Molin, 225 Mich. 8, 195 N. W. 797 (1923) (the defaulting
vendee recovered against the vendor on the ground that the vendee's equitable
title was a property interest which could be released only by a written memo-
randum); noted in (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 665.
11. Leuman v. Jones, 222 U. S. 51 (1911); Roche v. Fairbanks, 254 Mass. 7,
149 N. E. 548 (1925); Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N. Y. 490, 135 N. E. 861 (1922);
noted in (1922) 22 CoL. L. REv. 682; (1922) 36 HAR. L. Rv. 229; (1923) 32
YALE L. J. 831; 5 PouRnoy, op. cit. supra note 4, § 2273.
12. The statement of the requirement of mutuality of remedy, in Fuy,
SPECIFIC PERBUORi tACE (1858) § 286, restated in id. (6th ed. 1921) § 460, led
to its application in many cases.
13. Epstein v. Gluekin, supra note 11.
14. Lenman v. Jones, s.pra note 11; MeVoy v. Baumann, 93 N. J. Eq. 360, 117
Atl. 717 (1922), affd, 93 N. J. Eq. 638, 117 Atl. 725 (1922) ; First National Bank
v. Corporation Securities Co., 128 Minn. 341, 150 N. W. 1084 (1915). See also
CONTRACTS RESTATEBENT (Proposed Final Draft No. 12, 1932) § 372; Cootk,
The Present Status of the 'Lack of Mutuality" Rule (1927) 36 YA=E L. J. 897.
15. Archer v. Archer, 155 N. Y. 415, 50 N. E. 55 (1898); Epstein v. Glucldn,
supra note 11.
16. 1 PomERoy, op. cit. supra note 4, § 105.
17. Supra, notes 9 and 10.
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TAXATION op BUSINESS TRUSTS
THE problem of determining what trusts are, for purposes of federal taxation,
business trusts or "associations," and hence taxable as corporations, 1 has per-
plexed the courts since Hecht v. Malley.2 In that case the Supreme Court had
before it the government's claim that three trusts were associations and so were
subject to an excise tax levied upon corporations, joint stock companies and
associations. The court held that these were business trusts or associations
because their trustees were "associated together in much the same manner as
directors in a corporation for the purpose of carrying on business enterprises," 8
this being true "independently of the large measure of control exercised by
the beneficiaries." 4 The Board of Tax Appeals and the lower federal courts have
followed the Hecht case in repudiating the earlier test of control; 5 but the
double test of quasi-corporate organization and carrying on a business enter-
prise, which the Supreme Court set up in place of control, has not proved
workable.- Many trusts which issue shares to their beneficiaries and which en-
gage actively in business, do not come within the Hecht v. Malley definition of
an association because their trustees are not organized like a board of directors.
These trusts have not been allowed to escape taxation at the higher rate im-
posed upon associations; but the attempts to reconcile the decisions taxing
them as business trusts with the language of the Hecht case has resulted in
some confusion as to the test upon which the courts determine a trust's classi-
fication. The actual decisions of the courts, however, are not as confused as
a reading of their opinions would suggest.
Trusts carrying on industrial or commercial enterprises, as distinguished
from real estate operations, have been held with some uniformity to be business
trusts even if their organization bears no resemblance to that of corporations.
1. Associations and joint stock companies are taxed as corporations. § 1111,
RWENNUE; ACT OF 1932, PUBLic LAWS No. 154 (72d Cong., 1932), approved
June 6, 1932. Business trusts are included in this use of the word associations.
Hecht v. Malley, 265 U. S. 144 (1924).
2. 265 U. S. 144' (1924).
3. Id. at 161.
4. Ibid.
5. This test had been used since Crocker v. Malley, 249 U. S. 223 (1919),
the first case upon the question. Attempts have been made to distinguish this
case from Hecht v. Malley, supra note 2, and to show that the court in the
latter case did not necessarily repudiate control as a basis for classifying
trusts for purposes of income taxation. Rottschaefer, Massachusetts Trust
Under Federal Tax Law (1925) 25 Coi. L." REV. 305; Rommel, Tax Liability
of Business Trusts (1929) 7 N. I. T. M. 14. The attempted distinction has
not been made by the courts, however; control is no longer considered to be
a test. Burk-Waggoner Oil Association v. Hopkins, 269 U. S. 110 (1925);
White v. Hornblower, 27 F. (2d) 777 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928); Little Four Oil &
Gas Co. v. Lewellyn, 35 F. (2d) 149 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929); Trust No. 5833,
Security-First National Bank v. Welch, 54 F. (2d) 323 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931).
U. S. TREAs. REG. 69, Art. 1504 (1927), in which the beneficiaries' control over
the trustees is made one of the tests of whether or not a trust is taxable as
an association, has been held incompatible with the decisions of the courts,
since control is no longer considered to be the test. Fisk v. United States,
60 F. (2d) 665, 667 (D. Mass. 1932).
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Thus, trusts manufacturing vulcanizers,0 or engaged in oil production,; or own-
ing and managing an apartment house,8 or a cafeteria 0 or a theater,10 or
conducting an investment business," have been held to be business trusts. The
only trusts formed for similar activity that have not been taxed as associa-
tions have been those formed only for liquidation of an insolvent or dissolved
concern,12 or which have themselves sold out and dissolved before actually be-
ginning the business activities for which they were formed.1 3  With these
exceptions, however, the conclusion seems justified that any trust engaged in
industrial or commercial enterprises14 will be called a business trust and will
be taxed as an association, no matter how it is organized.
The classification of real estate trusts is not so readily predictable. Difficulty
is encountered in making the uncertain distinction between merely holding
property for the collection of income, and "carrying on a business." A trust
6. Anderson Steam Vulcanizer Co. v. Commissioner, 6 B. T. A. 737 (1927).
The trustees in this case did organize themselves in much the same manner
as a corporation's board of directors.
7. Little Four Oil & Gas Co. v. Lewellyn, supra note 5; E. A. Landreth
Co. v. Commissioner, 11 B. T. A. 1 (1928). In the first of these cases the
four trustees carried on the trust's business as individuals, not as a board of
directors. In the Landreth case a single trustee had complete charge of the
business, yet the Board held that the trust was conducting its business under
the form of a corporation. In Royal Syndicate v. Commissioner, 20 B. T. A.
255 (1930), a trust engaging in the production of the oil was held not to be
an association. But although this business was called a trust, it seems really
to have been a partnership. A small group of persons were concerned in the
venture, with title to the well held in the name of one of them as "trustee";
no shares were issued, and all the members participated in the trust's manage-
ment, discussing its affairs and making decisions vhen they met casually upon
the street. The case cited by the Board as authority for its decision was a
partnership case. Myers, Long & Co. v. Commissioner, 14 B. T. A. 460 (1928).
8. J. W. Pritchett v. Commissioner, 17 B. T. A. 1056 (1929). The three
trustees here managed the apartment house as individuals, not as a group or
board; they elected no officers and held no meetings.
9. Mary L. Dutton v. Commissioner, 18 B. T. A. 1151 (1930). This trust
did have quasi-corporate organization.
10. Rochester Theatre Trust Estate v. Commissioner, 16 B. T. A. 1275
(1929). There were two trustees of this trust; one was a bank, and the other
an individual who received $100 a year for his services.
11. Tulsa Mortgage Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 21 B. T. A. 735 (1930).
This trust did have quasi-corporate organization.
12. White v. Hornblower, supra note 5; Gonzolus Creek Oil Co. v. Com-
missioner, 12 B. T. A. 310 (1928).
13. Mason v. United States, 27 F. (2d) 1013 (D. Mass. 1928); Lucas v.
Extension Oil Co., 47 F. (2d) 65 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931); Appeal of Durfee
Mineral Co., 7 B. T. A. 231 (1927).
14. If a trust is not carrying on business, it will not be taxed as an associa-
tion. Thus where individuals loaning money to an oil enterprise formed a
trust to receive and distribute to themselves the profits from the enterprise with
which their loan was repaid, the trust was held not to be an association.
Jackson-Wermich Trust v. Commissioner, 24 B. T. A. 150 (1931).
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engaged only in holding property will not be taxed as an association; i6 but a
trust will probably be "doing business' if it sells some and acquires other real
estate,16 or if it invests in improvements on property already held.17 Owner-
ship of an office building is not "carrying on a business" when active manage-
ment of the property is delegated to agents.'8 Subdivision and development
projects are of course business enterprises.' 9 A further difficulty particularly
apparent in the classification of real estate trusts arises from the vagueness of
the term "liquidation." A trust whose only purpose is the immediate disposi-
tion of proper.ty, and whose activities are directed solely to that end, is liquid-
ating" 20 in the sense in which the word is ordinarily used. But in some cases
trusts engaging in what might otherwise be considered a real estate business
have escaped taxation as associations by insisting that, since their primary
purpose is sale of their property, they are only liquidating and not carrying
on a business. Thus, trusts that have been "liquidating" property holdings
for more than half a century have nevertheless been held not to have engaged
in business; 21 and in one case a trust conducting a large development and sub-
division project escaped taxation as an association by persuading the Board
of Tax Appeals that it was only liquidating the property.22 And although the
courts are reluctant to hold that ancestral trusts are associations, 23 ordinarily
finding that they are merely holding property or are liquidating it even when
15. Gardiner v. United States, 49 F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931); Lans-
downe Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 50 F. (2d) 56 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931);
Fisk v. United States, supra note 5; Terminal Properties Co. v. Commissioner,
19 B. T. A. 584 (1930). U. S. TREAS. REG. 74, Art. 1314 (1929).
16. C. W. Cowell Co. v Commissioner, 21 B. T. A. 1274 (1931); cf. Willis
v. Commissioner, 58 F. (2d) 121 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932). And the activities of
the trusts in the Hecht case appear to have been of this sort. The trust in
the Cowell case did have quasi-corporate organization; but in the Willis case
the three trustees were not required to, and did not, hold meetings, elect officers,
or otherwise conduct themselves as a board of directors,
17. Willis v. Commissioner, supra note 16.
18. Tyson v. Commissioner, 54 F. (2d) 29 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931) (Zenith Real
Estate Trust). Contra: Tyson v. Commissioner, 20 B. T. A. 597 (1930) (City
Real Estate Trust); and see Hecht v. Malley, supra note 2, at 162.
19. Trust No. 5833, Security-First National Bank v. Welch, mzpra note 5;
Sloan v. Commissioner, 24 B. T. A. 61 (1931). Contra: Lucian S. Moore, Jr.
v. Commissioner, 21 B. T. A. 1362 (1931). In the first of these cases an
elaborate indenture provided the appearance of quasi-corporate organization;
but in the Sloan case the two trustees carried on the business as individuals,
not as a board of directors.
20. Commissioner v. Atherton, 50 F. (2d) 740 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931).
21. Fisk v. United States, supra note 5; Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 21 B. T. A. 1214 (1931).
22. Lucian S. Moore, Jr. v. Commissioner, supra note 19.
23. Such trusts were held not to be associations in Blair v. Wilson Syndicate
Trust, 39 F. (2d) 43 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930); Gardiner v. United States,
supra note 15; Fisk v. United States, supra note 5; Wilson Trust v. Com-
missioner, 20 B. T. A. 549 (1930); Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
supra note 21; Morriss Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 23 B. T. A. 1076 (1931).
But cf. Willis v. Commissioner, and C. W. Cowell Co. v. Commissioner, both
supra note 16.
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they engage in business activities, 24 in one case the heirs of an undivided estate
neglected to provide in their indenture that the purpose of the trust was liquid-
ation and were held to have formed a business trust.25
In the recent case of McCormick v. Commissioncr,26 the Board of Tax Appeals
was called upon to classify a real estate trust whose only "activity" was holding
title to the Chicago Stock Exchange Building; 27 the trustees did not, as such,
supervise the agents who managed the property, or collect the income from it.2
The Board's decision that this trust was not an association seems consistent
with earlier eases.2 9
The Board of Tax Appeals in seeking to apply the double test of Hccht v.
Malley has at times been forced to find quasi-corporate organization where none
in fact existed.30 But though they have thus attempted to give weight to both
the elements specified by the Supreme Court, their decisions seem to have been
based primarily upon the activities in which the trustees engaged. The Federal
courts, in cases appealed from the Board's decision, have disregarded the first
part of the Hecht case test 3 ' and have declared that "the crucial test must be
found in -what the trustees actually do." 32 This test has the merit of simplicity,
and it may be justified upon the ground that all trusts engaging in business
enterprises, no matter how organized, have the important corporate advantages
of concentration of control and a fixed capital divided into freely transferable
shares.
JuRISDIcTIoN OvER PiEDGED AssETs IN RECEIVERSHIP ADmINISTEAnIIoN
REcmnaERs having been appointed by a federal district court in Illinois for the
insolvent Insull Utility Investments Corporation, a large part of the assets of
this corporation were found to be in the form of capital stock of other Illinois
24. Thus in the Dauphin Deposit Trust case, supra note 21, the trust owned
a hotel and had it reconstructed into an office building; and in the Morriss
Realty Co. case, supra note 23, the trust was engaged in subdividing some
of the property it owned, and constructing houses on the lots. Yet these trusts
were said not to be associations. But cf. Willis v. Commissioner, allpra note 16.
25. C. W. Cowell Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 16.
26. 26 B. T. A. -, decided Oct. 11, 1932.
27. The three sons of Cyrus H. McCorniick, desiring a large loan for the
McCormick Harvester Machine Co. without the publicity attendant upon a
mortgage, transferred this building (which they already owned) to themselves
as trustees, and issued shares of beneficial interest to the Scotch bank from
which they secured the money. The loan was repaid in 1912.
28. Since repayment of the loan, title has remained in the trust; but the
building has, throughout the life of the trust, been managed and the income
from it handled by the office responsible for all the McCormicks' investments.
29. On somewhat similar facts trusts were held not to be associations in
Lansdowne Realty Trust v. Commissioner, supra note 15, and in Wilson Trust
v. Commissioner, supra note 23; and cf. Tyson v. Commissioner (Zenith Real
Estate Trust), supra note 18.
30. See cases supra notes 7, 8, 10, 16, and 19.
31. The federal courts have not discussed the quasi-corporate organiza-
tion, or the lack of such organization, in any case that has come before them.
32. Gardiner v. United States, supra note 15, at 996.
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corporations pledged with banks in New York as collateral for loans. Upon
representation immediately upon the appointment of the receivers that the
New York banks were about to sell this collateral stock, apparently in accord-
ance with the terms of its pledge, the court issued an order temporarily en-
joining such sale pending investigation to obtain adequate knowledge as to the
rights of the parties in interest. In response to a motion by the banks to dissolve
the injunction, the court reaffirmed its jurisdiction and denied the motion.1
Appeal was then taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the
lower court and ordered the injunction dissolved, declaring the "situs" of the
pledged stock to be, for purposes of this suit, in New York.2
While the Circuit Court of Appeals places its denial of validity of the in-
junctive order squarely on the ground that the situs of the pledged stock is
in New York, it nevertheless declares itself to be persuasively influenced by
the recent case, In re Hudson River Navigation Corporation.3 This case, decided
by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit, and following two earlier
cases of the same court,4 declared a bankruptcy court to be without jurisdiction
to restrain the sale by a pledgee, in accordance with the terms of the pledge,
of collateral pledged by the bankrupt more than four months prior to the
adjudication. Here no question of territorial jurisdiction is raised; and that
question is indeed entirely distinct from the power of the court to enjoin the
sale of pledged securities, in either equity or bankruptcy proceedings. If, in the
Insull case, the Illinois court does not have jurisdiction of the res pledged (as
the higher court holds), it is obviously superfluous to discuss the matter of
enjoining its sale by the pledgee. The comments of the court on that subject
must therefore be taken to indicate that even though jurisdiction of the res
pledged were admitted, it would still be persuaded to deny the injunction against
its sale through fear of disturbing the security of transactions of that sort by
preventing the pledgee from choosing his own time to sell. That such con-
siderations must weigh heavily with the court asked to enjoin such a sale is
obvious. In exercising its discretion the court must consider the probability
of the loss by the pledgee of any of the value of his security as well as the
expected beneficial effects to the estate as a whole, and other creditors, to be
gained by an injunction.5  To deny that a bankruptcy or equity court has the
power to direct the liquidation of assets according to its own discretion, how-
ever, regardless of subsisting liens, is to run counter to the apparently unani-
mous authority of federal decisions outside the Second Cireuit.0 The Supreme
1. Cherry v. Insull Utility Investments, 58 F. (2d) 1022 (N. D). Ill. 1932).
This case is noted on another point, inf ra p. 276.
2. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Fentress; Guaranty Trust Co. v. McNally (heard
together), U. S. Daily, Oct. 31, 1932, at 1574 (C. C. A. '7th, 1932).
3. 57 F. (2d) 175 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
4. In 7e Mertens, 144 Fed. 818 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906); In ro Mayer, 157 Fed.
836 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907).
5. This is admitted and discussed in the opinion of It ra Hudson Rivoy
Navigation Corporation, supra note 3.
6. Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie and Timber Co., 282 U. S. 734 (1931); Straton v.
New, 283 U. S. 318 (1931); In re Utt, 105 Fed. 754 (C. C. A. 7th, 1901);
In re Williams, 156 Fed. 934 (C. C. A. 9th, 1907); In re Waggoner, 206 Ped.
789 (N. D. Tex. 1913); Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Ry. Steel Spring Co.,
258 Fed. 346 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919); In re Purkett, Douglas and Co., 50 F. (2d)
435 (S. D. Cal. 1931); see Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U. S. 734 (1876); Matter
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Court in a very recent case, after holding that valid liens subsist in bank-
ruptcy proceedings concluded that nevertheless: "It is solely within the power
of a court of bankruptcy to ascertain their validity and amount and to dccreo
the method of their liquidation." 7 Furthermore, sales by pledgees or other
lienors of property of various sorts, including intangibles, in the hands of
bankruptcy or equity receivers have been declared void repeatedly, for want
of leave of the court appointing the receivers and state courts have been
denied jurisdiction to enforce liens against property in the hands of a receiver
of a federal court 9 In general, it may be said that property in the hands of
a receiver appointed by a court may not be interfered with in order to carry
out private agreements, contracts, or trusts; 10 and furthermore, that a court
which is administering property already in its hands through a receivership
may properly draw to itself all disputes as to liens or other rights on or per-
taining to such property.1
If, therefore, the Illinois court had jurisdiction of the stock pledged with
the New York banks, it would seem by the overwhelming weight of authority that
it had the power to enjoin its sale; and that its action in that regard could
be attacked only on the ground of abuse of discretion-which is nowhere sug-
gested. It may be noted that even in the Hudson River Navigation Corporation
case the power of the court to enjoin the sale of the pledged securities at
certain stages of the bankruptcy proceedings is admitted; and that the denial
of the injunction was not necessarily a denial of the power to enjoin, under
the circumstances of the case, reducing the words of the court denying such
jurisdiction to obiter dicta.
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of the jurisdiction of a court to
exercise full control over the liquidation of assets in the hands of its receivers,
regardless of liens or pledges, is also the strongest argument for extending
of Higgins, 179 Fed. 490 (C. C. A. 8th, 1910); Reihle v. Margolies, 279 U. S.
218, 223 (1929). In the case last cited the court states: "The appointment of
a receiver of a debtor's property by a federal court confers upon it, regardless
of citizenship, and of the amount in controversy, federal jurisdiction to decide
all questions incident to the preservation, collection, and distribution of assets."
But see Risk v. Kansas Trust and Banking Co., 58 Fed. 45 (C. C. D. Kans. 1893);
International Banking Corporation v. Lynch, 269 Fed. 242 (C. C. A. 9tb, 1920).
7. Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie and Timber Co., supra note 6, at 738. (Italics sup-
plied).
8. Wiswall v. Sampson, 14 How. 52 (U. S. 1852); Hitz v. Jenks, 185 U. S.
155 (1902); In re Waggoner, supra note 6.
9. In re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164 (1893); Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie and Timber Co.,
supra note 6; Toledo Ry. v. Trust Co., 95 Fed. 497 (C. C. A. 6th, 1899). But
see Straton v. New, supra note 6, holding that execution of a judgment lien
on a judgment recovered more than four months before the institution of bank-
ruptcy proceedings may not be enjoined by the bankruptcy court.
10. See Wiswall v. Sampson, supra note 8, at 66; In re Tyler, supra note
9, at 181; Hitz v. Jenks, supra note 8; Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Ry.
Steel Spring Co., supra note 6; HIGH, REc slvms (3d ed. 1894) § 141.
11. Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Lake Street Elevated Rr. Co., 177 U. S.
51 (1900); Wabash Ry. Co. v. Adelbert College, 208 U. S. 38 (1908); Central
Trust Co. v. South Atlantic & 0. Rr. Co., 57 Fed. 3 (C. C. W. D. Va. 1893);
Toledo Ry. v. Trust Co., supra note 9; see Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Ry.
Steel Spring Co., supra note 6.
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its jurisdiction to intangible assets of the debtor whose tangible evidence, in
the form of notes, bonds, or stock certificates, are not physically present within
the state-namely, the great advantages to be gained in direct cost, efficiency,
and consistency, from the unitary administration of such an estate, for the
benefit of all its creditors. In a case of doubt as to jurisdiction, which the
court admits was present in the Insull case, it would appear that this argument
should be highly persuasive.
SITus or CORPORATE STOCK IN RECEIMVRsHIP ADMINISTRATION
ON May 15, 1932, in response to a creditor's bill, receivers were appointed for
the extensive holdings of the Insull Utility Investments Corporation by a federal
district court in Illinois, the state of its corporate domicile. Many millions of
dollars of the assets of this corporation were found to be in the form of capital
stock of prosperous operating utilities corporations, also of Illinois,'but pledged
with banks of New York as collateral for loans now exceeding the value of
the stock. Upon representation by the receivers, immediately upon their ap-
pointment, that the New York banks were about to sell this collateral stock at
public auction the following morning, apparently in accordance with the terms
of its pledge, the federal court in Illinois issued an order temporarily
enjoining such sale pending investigation to obtain adequate knowledge as to
the rights of the parties in interest. The banks appeared specially to deny
the jurisdiction of the court and moved that the restraining order be dissolved,
This motion was denied on the ground that the res, the collateral whose sale
was enjoined, was capital stock of Illinois corporations, owned by another Illi-
nois corporation whose assets had, through the receivership, passed into the
hands of the court.1 The Circuit Court of Appeals thought otherwise, however,
and, upon appeal, ordered the injunction dissolved for want of jurisdiction, the
"situs" of the stock for purposes of this suit being, according to its view, in
New York; the higher court admitting, nevertheless, that its decision was not
free from doubt.
2
It must be clear that the attributing of "situs", in its dictionary sense of
physical location, to capital stock of a corporation is pure fiction.8 The stock
itself, being intangible, can have no geographical location. It is an aggregate
of relations subsisting between the corporation and a second party, who, by
virtue of these relations, is said to own the stock. This relation is evidenced
by tangible stock certificates, which must not be confused with the stock itself.4
1. Cherry v. Insull Utility Investments, 58 F.(2d) 1022 (N. D. Ill. 1932).
This case is noted on another point, supra p. 273.
2. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Fentress; Guaranty Trust Co. v. McNally (heard
together), U. S. Daily, Oct. 31, 1932, at 1574 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932).
3. See Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930);
Safe Deposit and Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 280
U. S. 83, 98 (1929) (Holmes' dissenting opinion); Pomerance, The Situs of
Stock (1931) 17 CORN. L. Q. 43.
4. Winslow v. Fletcher, 53 Conn. 390, 4 Atl. 250 (1885); Smith v. Downey,
8 Ind. App. 179, 34 N. E. 823, 35 N. E. 568 (1893); Armour Brothers Banking
Co. v. St. Louis National Bank, 113 Mo. 12, 20 S. W. 690 (1892); Plimpton v.
Bigelow, 93 N. Y. 592 (1883) ; Moore v. Gennett, 2 Tenn. Ch. 375 (1875) ; Young
v. South Tredegar Iron Co., 85 Tenn. 189, 2 S. W. 202 (1886); see Farmers
Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 3.
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It is true that the Uniform Stock Transfer Act confers upon the stock certi-
ficate a high degree of negotiability in and of itself.5 The purpose and effect
of this negotiability is, however, merely to facilitate the transfer from one
party to another in commercial transactions of the obligations and liabilities of
the corporation to the owner of the stock, without liability of a subsequent
owner to special defenses or equities in favor of the corporation -which might
formerly have existed. This negotiability of the stock certificate doe3 not
purport to change the stock-ownership relation, or to assimilate the stock itself
into the certificate -which represents it.G
It would seem reasonable that in order to entertain a suit concerning cor-
porate stock a court should have jurisdiction of at least one of the parties to
the relation-the corporation, or the owner of the stock; and this view has
often been announced as the law.7 For purposes of determining ownership
of stock, jurisdiction of the corporation itself has been held to suffice, regardless
of the presence of either the alleged owner or the stock certificates involved.
8
For purposes of taxation of the stock as property of its owner, the principle
moblia sequuntur personam has been held to govern, requiring jurisdiction of
the owner.9 The Supreme Court has expressly overruled its former position
to the contrary, and denied such taxing power to the state having personal
jurisdiction of the corporation, or of the certificates, but not of the owner of
the stock.'o
The necessity of personal jurisdiction of either of the parties to the stock-
ownership relationship, however, has often been dispensed with where the stock
certificates -were physically present within the jurisdiction.11 In such cases
5. 6 U. L. A. (Stock Transfer Act) § 5.
6. See Pomerance, op. cit. supra note 3. The Uniform Stock Transfer Act
consistently distinguishes between the certificates and the "the shares repre-
sented thereby". See 6 U. L. A. § 21.
7. Plimpton v. Bigelow, supra note 4; see Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322 (U.
S. 1854); Chase v. Wetzlar, 225 U. S. 79 (1912).
8. Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U. S. 1 (1900); Harvey v.
Harvey, 290 Fed. 653 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923) (District Judge Lindley, who enjoined
the New York banks from selling the pledged securities in the Insull case, speaks
for the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit, enjoining in this case
also an absent defendant from disposing of stock whose ownership it was the
purpose of the suit to determine.) Young v. South Tredegar Iron Co., mupra
note 4 (even where the incorporation was in another state, but the chief office
and place of business of the corporation in the state where the suit is brought).
9. Safe Deposit and Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Commonwealth of Virginia,
supra note 3; Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra, note 3 (a full
exposition of the present legal theory); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586
(1930); Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U. S. 1 (1930); First
National Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
10. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189 (1903), holding that bank deposits
in New York, property of a decedent domiciled in Illinois, were subject to
inheritance tax in New York as well as in Illinois, was expressly overruled by
Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 3, which latter case has
been followed by the subsequent cases cited in note 9, supra, all of which have
been decided within the past two years.
11. Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Co., 267 U. S. 22 (1925);
Merritt v. American Steel Barge Co., 79 Fed. 228 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897); Blake
YALE LAW JOURNAL
the certificates themselves have been accounted as property giving the court
in rem jurisdiction to enforce a claim against its owner to the extent of the
value of the stock itself.12 The Supreme Court has held that ownership of
the paper must be determined according to the law of the place where it is
located; 13 and it has gone so far as to suggest that the exercise by a state of
its power to ignore in the transfer of ownership of the paper the transfer in
ownership of the stock would place such state beyond the pale of civilization
14
On the other hand, in accordance with the principle already stated, it is well
settled that a state may not impose an inheritance tax on stock owned by a
non-resident decedent simply because the certificates are physically within the
state.15 And in a case of dispute as to the decedent's domicile, where one state,
having possession of stock certificates of a foreign corporation, has taken pro-
bate jurisdiction and awarded the stock in accordance with its laws of suc-
cession, the Supreme Court has approved the subsequent award by the foreign
state of the same stock, in accordance with its laws, to a different heir.10 Here
the second state exercised its power to ignore the award of the certificates by
the first state, and ordered the corporation which it had chartered to cancel
such certificates and issue new ones to the heir which it had designated-all,
apparently, without placing itself beyond the pale of civilization. - This ease,
however, does not hold further than that, as between the state of incorporation
and the state in which stock certificates are located, in a case of disputed
probate jurisdiction, the state of incorporation will prevail as to the true owner-
ship of the stock in inheritance. This is entirely in accord with the disputed
ownership cases already mentioned.lT
Although, in spite of the cases last mentioned, the physical presence of stock
certificates in a state has often been taken to confer jurisdiction for purposes
of attachment to enforce liens against the stock,' 8 no cases have arisen, ap-
parently, prior to the Insull case which declare the physical possession of the
certificates within the territorial jurisdiction of the court to be essential to
maintaining a suit where both the issuing corporation and the owner of the
stock-or indeed either of them-are within such jurisdiction.10  While the
v. Foreman Brothers Banking Co., 218 Fed. 264 (N. D. Ill. 1914); Puget Sound
National Bank v. Mather, 60 Minn. 362, 62 N. W. 396 (1895); Simpson v. Jersey
City Constructing Co., 165 N. Y. 193, 58 N. E. 896 (1900).
12. 36 STAT. 1102 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 118 (1926). See cases cited supra
note 11.
13. Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Co., supra note 11.
14. In the Disconto-Gesellschaft case Justice Holmes, speaking for the court,
after noting that the United States had the power to refuse to recognize title
acquired by the Public Trustee in England to stock in an American corporation
through the seizure of stock certificates in the hands of enemies, according to
the law of England, added "But it (the United States) prefers to consider itself
civilized, and to act accordingly". Disconto-Gesellsehaft v. United States Steel
Co., supra note 11, at 28.
15. Supra note 9.
16. Baker v. Baker, Eccles and Co., 242 U. S. 394 (1917).
17. Supra note 8.
18. Supra note 11. Contra: Pinney v. Nevills, 86 Fed. 97 (C. C. D, Mass.
1898); Winslow v. Fletcher; Smith v. Downey; Plimpton v. Bigelow, all supra
note 4. See other cases cited in same note.
19. But see Gilmore v. Robillard, 44 F. (2d) 295 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930).
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higher court is without doubt correct in pointing out that situs for jurisdictional
purposes must be considered in regard to the particular situation in which it
becomes material 20 - destroying the significance of a recent taxation case cited
by the district court as controlling 2 1 - nothing of a jurisdictional nature is
indicated in the present situation which, against the background of former cases,
should immunize the stock of Illinois corporations, owned by an Illinois cor-
poration in receivership, from the control of the Illinois court.
22
POWER OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGE To HOLD DISTRICT COUNRT
THE INTERBOROUGH RECEIVERSHIP
PURSUANT to § 18 of the Judicial Code,' Senior Circuit Judge Manton found
that the public interest required the designation of himself to hold a district
court for the Southern District of New York. Under the standing order for
the distribution of business in that district, a certain district judge had been
assigned to hear applications for the appointment of receivers in equity causes.
Judge Manton formally announced his disagreement with such division of busi-
ness and, invoking Section 23 of the Judicial Code,2 appealed to himself in his
capacity as senior circuit judge to resolve the dispute. Accordingly, Judge
Manton ordered that applications for the appointment of receivers be thence-
forward made before himself as district judge, in addition to the regularly as-
signed judge. The following day, upon the petition of the American Brake Shoo &
Foundry Co., Judge Manton named receivers to manage and operate the railroads
of the Interborough Rapid Transit Co., and appointed attorneys for the receivers.
The receivership order was later extended to include the Manhattan Railway
Co., a subsidiary of the Interborough. Thereupon Johnson, a stockholder of the
Manhattan Railway Co., petitioned District Judge Woolsey to vacate Judge
Manton's orders and appointments. 3 The complainant likewise sought the ap-
pointment of new receivers. Judge Woolsey, on his own initiative, consolidated
the Brake Shoe and Johnson suits, and in response to the petition, signed an
order setting "aside as wholly void and of no juridical effect" the appointment
of receivers by Judge Manton. The operation of this order was suspended for
twenty days, and the request for the appointment of new receivers was denied
without prejudice, pending the outcome of an appeal by the defendants. The
20. See also Pomerance, op. cit. supra note 3.
21. First National Bank v. Maine, supra, note 9.
92. While the higher court is clearly influenced in its decision by the fact
that the stock in question was pledged in the hands of the absent defendants,
this consideration raises a problem that is entirely distinct from the matter of
territorial jurisdiction, to which the above discussion is addressed. Jurisdic-
tion of the court, through its receivers, over pledged assets of the insolvent
corporation is discussed in a separate note infra on the same case.
1. 36 STAT. 1089 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 22 (1926).
2. 36 STAT. 1090 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 27 (1926).
3. The Interborough has a 999-year lease of the Manhattan Railway lines.
The stockholders of the Manhattan Railway Co. saw in the Interborough re-
ceivership an attempt to abrogate this lease.
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petition to vacate Judge Manton's orders assigning himself to hold a district
court and to hear applications for the appointment of receivers was denied
for want of jurisdiction. 4
The technical argument supporting the legality of Judge Manton's orders is
difficult to disprove. Section 18 of the Judicial Code expressly authorizes the
senior circuit judge, "if the public interest requires," to "assign any circuit
judge of a judicial circuit to hold a district court." r The determination of
whether a sufficient public interest exists to warrant the exercise of this author-
ity lies in the discretion of the senior circuit judge whose decision is not subject
to judicial review. 6 A judge so appointed is invested with the duties and powers
of the judges of the district,7 among which, it can reasonably be urged, is the
privilege to dissent from whatever division of business may have been previously
agreed upon. Provision is made in the Judicial Code that in the event of such
disagreement, the senior circuit judge "shall make all necessary orders for the
division of business and the assignment of cases for trial." 8 Therefore, In
passing upon the very dispute he had created, Judge Manton brought himself
within thd letter of the Judicial Code. He did, however, disregard a newly
adopted rule of the District Court declaring that any judge designated to sit
in that court "shall do such work only as may be assigned to him by the senior
district judge." 9 District court rules are generally giveil the force of lav,lo
insofar as they are consistent with the laws of the United States.11 But in
this case there is an apparent conflict between the court rule and Section 18
of the Judicial Code.12 For it is apparent that the power of the senior circuit
judge to appoint himself or any other circuit judge to sit in the district court
can be effectively nullified if the judge so designated can perform only the
functions assigned him by the senior district judge. Moreover, each judge has
the inherent power possessed by any other judge of the same court to try any
case within the jurisdiction of that court, regardless of existing rules of prac-
4. Johnson v. Manhattan Railway Co. (S. D. N. Y.) U. S. Daily, Oct. 25,
1932, at 1542.
5. Supra note 1.
6. See United States v. Gill, 292 Fed. 136, 137 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923); of.
People v. Supreme Court, 220 N. Y. 487, 116 N. E. 384 (1917).
7. Ex parte United States, 226 U. S. 420 (1913); Harmon v. United States,
43 Fed. 817 (C. C. Colo. 1890); Industrial & Mining Guaranty Co. v. Electrical
Supply Co., 58 Fed. 732 (C. C. A. 6th, 1893); Demaris v. Barker, 33 Wash. 200,
74 Pac. 362 (1903); see 36 STAT. 1090 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 23 (1926).
8. Supra note 2.
9. Rule 1 (a) of General Rules of the District Court for the Southern District
of New York.
10. Weil v. Neary, 278 U. S. 160 (1929); American Graphophono Co. v.
National Phonograph Co., 127 Fed. 349 (C. C. N. Y. 1904); Galveston Dry Dock
& Construction Co. v. Standard Dredging Co., 40 F. (2d) 442 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930);
Thompson v. Hatch, 20 Mass. 512 (1826).
11. Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U. S. 123 (1864); Davidson Marble Co. v. Gibson,
213 U. S. 10 (1909); Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore & Phil-
adelphia Steamboat Co., 263 U. S. 629 (1924); see Hudson v. Parker, 156 U. S.
277, 284 (1895); 1 STAT. 335 (1793), 28 U. S. C. § 731 (1926). See 6 HuOHEs,
FEDERAL PRACTICE JunIsDIcTIoN & PocEDuRE (1931) § 3782.
12. Supra note 1.
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tice or agreements for the apportionment of business.1 3 The violation of such
rules is considered a mere irregularity and not a jurisdictional defect.
14
There is thus an adequate basis for the conclusion that in appointing a re-
ceiver for the Interborough, Manton acted as a do jure judge. In any event,
he acted -with sufficient color of legal authority to constitute him a do facto
judge.15 Admittedly, in either case, the orders made by Judge Manton in the
Brake Shoe suit could not be collaterally attacked in any other action,10 and
no authority would be vested in Judge Woolsey to vacate orders entered by
Manton sitting as a judge of coordinate jurisdiction.17 Judge Woolsey attempted
to overcome this difficulty by denying that Judge Manton was eithera do jtro
or do facto judge, and holding that he was a "usurper" whose acts -were void
and without effect. The only foundation for this conclusion, however, is the
violation of a court rule of doubtful validity. Judge Woolsey made a further
effort to acquire jurisdiction over the Brake Shoo case by consolidating it with
the Johnson suit.' s It is difficult to see how such a device could accord him the
power to enter an order in one action which would affect the receivership orders
made by Judge Manton in another. For it is commonly recognized that the
consolidation of causes in equity is primarily a procedural expedient for con-
venience and economy, and does not alter the independence of the suits, or
make the parties in one action parties in the other.10
Although Judge Manton's position may be technically unimpeachable, his
exercise of power seems of doubtful propriety. The authority to designate a
circuit judge to hold a district court is expressly restricted to the requirements
13. People v. Barbera, 78 Cal. App. 277, 248 Pac. 304 (1926); White v.
Superior Court, 110 Cal. 60, 42 Pac. 480 (1895); Foley v. Utterback, 196 Iowa
956, 195 N. W. 721 (1923) ; State v. Lichtenberg, 4 Wash. 553, 30 Pac. 659 (1892).
14. People v. Barbera; White v. Superior Court, both supra, note 13. Cf.
Abbott v. Brown, 241 U. S. 606 (1916); Payne v. Garth, 285 Fed. 301 (C. C. A.
8th, 1922); People v. Extraordinary Trial Term, 228 N. Y. 463, 127 N. E.
486 (1920).
15. For a comprehensive discussion of do facto judges see State v. Carroll,
38 Conn. 449 (1871).
16. In re Manning, 139 U. S. 504 (1891); Ball v. United States, 140 U. S.
118 (1891); McDowell v. United States, 159 U. S. 596 (1895); Luhrig Collieries
Co. v. Interstate Coal & Dock Co., 287 Fed. 711 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), cert. do
262 U. S. 751 (1923); Hamlin v. Kassafer, 15 Ore. 456, 15 Pac. 778 (1887);
see United States v. Alexander, 46 Fed. 728, 729 (D. Idaho, 1891); MEcHX,
PuBLIC OFFicnus (1890) §§ 328, 330.
17. Commercial Union of America v. Anglo-South American Bank, 10 F.
(2d) 937 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); Hardy v. North Butte Mining Co., 22 F. (2d) 62
(C. C. A. 9th, 1927); Price v. Life & Casualty Insurance Co., 201 N. C. 376, 160
S. E. 367 (1931); Enderlin State Bank v. Jennings, 4 N. D. 228, 59 N. W. 1058
(1894); Warren, Wallace & Co. v. Simon, 16 S. C. 362 (1881).
18. Pursuant to 3 STAT. 21 (1813), 28 U. S. C. § 734 (1926).
19. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U. S. 285 (1892) ; Toledo R. R.
Co. v. Continental Trust Co., 95 Fed. 497 (C. C. A. 6th, 1899), cert. deM 176
U. S. 219 (1900); Taylor v. 'Logan Trust Co., 289 Fed. 51 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923);
Vapor Car Heating Co. v. Gold Car Heating & Lighting Co., 296 Fed. 201 (S.
D. N. Y. 1923), cert. den. 268 U. S. 705 (1925); see Adler v. Seaman, 260 Fed.
828, 831 (C C.. A. 8th, 1920), cert. den. 254 U. S. 655 (1921); 6 HUGHES, op.
cit. supra note 11, § 3855.
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of the public interest. The fact that no limitation is placed upon the dis-
cretion of the senior circuit judge as to the existence of a public interest does
not warrant its promiscuous exercise. Section 18 was inserted in the Judicial Code
to enable a circuit judge sitting in an action pending in the old circuit court
at the~time of its abolition, to continue to preside when the suit was trans-
ferred to the district court, so that a district judge would not be required to
take up the unfinished cause and familiarize himself with its prior history. o20
The statute may be reasonably construed to embrace the type of public interest
present -when there is an accumulation of business in the district court, or where
a district judge is ill or has been disqualified. 21 The motivating cause for Judge
Manton's action in the instant case was the ,desire to prevent the impending
appointment of a certain New York trust company as receivers for the Inter-
borough.22 It is doubtful whether Congress intended anything of that nature
to constitute a real and evident public interest. Likewise, Section 23 of the
Judicial Code 23 was undoubtedly designed to provide a method of breaking a
real deadlock among the district judges on the agreement of business, and not
to embrace a situation in which the senior circuit judge had precipitated a con-
flict as a preliminary to deciding it in his own favor. Moreover, Judge Manton's
action in appealing to himself to adjust the dispute he had created, was incon-
sistent in spirit with a definite policy against permitting judges to review their
own decisions. 24
An appeal by the receivers from Judge Woolsey's decision will soon come
before the Circuit Court of Appeals. That court may well decide that Judge
Woolsey lacked jurisdiction to vacate the orders made by Judge Manton,25 and
that the proper procedure would have been for the plaintiff in the Johnson suit
to intervene in the Brake Shoe case with his petition for the appointment of
new receivers. The Court might also indicate that it would be politic for Judge
Manton to find that the public interest no longer required him to hold a district
court. The way would then be open for his replacement by a district judge
as presiding officer of the Interborough receivership. To sustain Judge Woolsey's
decision nullifying Judge Manton's appointment of receivers would be to in-
validate all the orders and acts performed by the receivers in the few months
they have had possession of the property of the Interborough, causing Irre-
parable injury to the interests of innocent parties. 26 On the other hand, if
new receivers are appointed on the application of an intervenor in the Brake
20. See Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry. Co., 221 Fed. 440, 442
(S. D. N. Y. 1915).
21. United States v. Gill, supra note 6; see Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New
York City Ry. Co., supra note 20, at 443; 46 Cong. Rec. 302, 304 (1910); of. 36
STAT. 1089 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 17 (1926).
22. See Judge Manton's instructions to the Interborough receivers, N. Y.
L. J., Oct, 20, 1932, at 1613, 1614.
23. Supra note 2.
24. United States v. Lancaster, 18 U. S. 434 (1820); Moran v. Dilllngharii,
174 U. S. 153 (1899); Rexford v. Brunswick-Balke Co., 228 U. S. 339 (1913).
See 36 STAT. 1132 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 216 (1926).
25. Supra note 17.
26. Cf. Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36 (1928) (a receivership action
brought by fraud in a federal court was transferred to the state court on con-
dition that the state court receivers confirmed all the acts and orders of the
federal receivers); noted in (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 832.
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Shoe case, they would succeed to the position of the former receivers whose
acts would be given full effect.27 But in any event the result of this judicial
conflict over the power to appoint receivers and control receiverships is that
the reorganization of an important utility is at a virtual standstill.
TAxATIoN OF RESMENT'S INCOME EARNED OUTSME THE STATE
A RESIDENT of Mississippi was taxed by that state on income earned from con-
structing roads in Tennessee. In an action to set aside the assessment, the
plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the act imposing the tax on the
ground that it deprived him of due process of law in taxing him on income
earned beyond the borders of the state. In affirming a decision of the state
court 1 sustaining the validity of the tax, the United States Supreme Court
held that is was within the jurisdiction of Mississippi to impose the tax because
of the protection afforded by that state to the recipient of the income.
2
Under the theory that an income tax is a tax on the person, measured by the
income received,3 the jurisdiction of the domiciliary state over the recipient of
the income as a resident seems sufficient to support a tax on income earned in
other states. However, if the tax is considered as one on the property from
which the income is derived, 4 the conventional result would be that the tax in
question is invalid, since a state cannot tax tangible property located outside
its borders. 5 The theory prevailing in still other jurisdictions, that an income
tax is a tax on the income itself as property,o leaves open the question as to
whether the income is properly taxable in the non-domiciliary state where it is
earned, or in the domiciliary state where it is received, or in both. Finally,
there is the concept of an income tax as an excise, taldng the form of either a
tax on the privilege of conducting income-producing activities or a tax on the
privilege of receiving income.7 Regarding the tax as coming within the former
category, it would be difficult to justify a tax by the domiciliary state on privi-
leges pursued elsewhere; but assuming that the recipient brings the money into
the state of his residence, the latter alternative seems to supply a subject of
27. Pagett v. Brooks, 140 Ala. 257, 37 So. 263 (1904); see Virginia-Carolina
Chemical Co. v. Hunter, 84 S. C. 214, 224, 66 S. E. 177, 180 (1909); 1 Cw.x,
RECEIVERS (2d ed. 1929) § 692 (a).
1. Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 162 Miss. 338, 137 So. 503 (1931).
Another aspect of this case is discussed in Note (1932) 32 CoL. L. REv. 534.
2. Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U. S. 276 (1932). The court
also held that the exemption of corporations from a similar tax did not deprive
plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws. The issue involved therein is
beyond the scope of this note.
3. Crescent Manufacturing Co. v. Tax Commission, 129 S. C. 4S0, 485, 124
S. E. 761, 762 (1924).
4. Opinion of the Justices, 220 Mass. 613, 624, 108 N. E. 570, 574 (1915).
5. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905); Frich
v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 488 (1925). The extent of this doctrine is dis-
cussed in Harper, Jurisdiction of the States to Tax-Rccont Developments (1930)
5 IND. L. J. 507, 510.
6. State v. Pinder, 30 Del. 416, 422, 108 Ati. 43, 46 (1919); Eliasberg Bros.
Mercantile Co. v. Grimes, 204 Ala. 492, 499, 86 So. 56, 62 (1920).
7. Hattiesberg Grocery Co. v. Robertson, 126 Miss. 34, 88 So. 4 (1921).
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taxation by the domiciliary state. In the instant case, the Supreme Court rejects
a consideration of the various theories as a basis for deciding the constitutional
issue, and establishes domicile as the test of validity. This formula obviates
the confusion resulting from reliance upon the definitions and interpretations
placed upon local income tax statutes by the state courts.
Since it was established in Shaffer v. Carter 8 that a state may tax income
earned by non-residents within its borders, there exists the possibility of sub-
jecting the recipient to double taxation. A full exercise by all the states of
their power to tax, as sanctioned by the Court in the instant case and in the
Shaffer case, would produce double taxation in every instance where a person
or corporation does business in a non-domiciliary state. Although not in Itself
unconstitutional, double taxation is regarded as extremely undesirable.
0 In
the principal case, however, Tennessee imposed no tax on the plaintiff's income.
Therefore, to hold the Mississippi tax invalid would relieve the plaintiff of
paying a tax in either state. But such a situation can obtain only as long as
states refrain from exercising their constitutional powers of taxation. Were
these powers uniformly exercised in their fullest degree, the problem of double
taxation would become acute.The possible result of the present decision suggests the wisdom of remedial
legislation.' 0 The United States has recognized the existence of international
double taxation, and in taxing citizens and domestic corporations on income
earned from all sources, allows certain credits for taxes paid to foreign govern-
ments, or possessions of the United States.11 New York alleviates the burden
of double taxation by permitting deductions from taxes payable to the state by
non-residents on income earned within the state, amounting to such proportion
of the tax paid to the domiciliary state as the income earned in New York bears
to the total income; such credits are allowed, however, only in cases whore the
other state grants substantially similar credits to New York residents.12 Adop-
tion in all the states of the method employed by the federal government would
result in taxation at the source of the income,13 whereas reciprocal arrangements
in all the states embracing the New York rule would confine taxation to the
domiciliary state.14 Both methods appear equally effective, but the probable
reluctance of the states to forego taxation powers sanctioned by the Supreme
Court minimizes the possibility of uniform acceptance of either approach to the
problem.
8. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 (1920).
9. Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730 (1903).
10. Legislative efforts by the various nations to mitigate the hardships of
international double taxation are set forth in HERNDON, RELILT FROM INTEn-
NATIONAL INCOME TAXATION (1932) c. 10.
11. 45 STAT. 829 (1928), 26 U. S. C. Supp. 1 § 2131a (1928). The operation
of this section is illustrated in HERNDON, op. cit. supra note 10, c. 14 § 8.
12. N. Y. TAX LAW (1921) § 363.
13. For the view that the non-domiciliary state should be given the power
to tax, see Rottschaeffer, State Jurisdiction of Income for Tax Purposes (1931)
44 HARv. L. Rnv. 1075, 1099.
14. For the view that the domiciliary state should be given the power to
tax, see Kessler, Some Legal Problems in State Personal Income Taxation (1925)
34 YALE L. J. 863, 878.
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CoNsTRucTIV SERvicE ON NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANT IN SUIT
TO REFORI LIFE INSURANCE POLICY
Surrs for the reformation of written instruments are generally held to require
personal service on a non-resident defendant,1 upon the theory that such actions
directly affect his substantive rights.2 However, exceptions to this rule are
found in actions concerning the status of land, such as suits for the reforma-
tion of deeds, 3 acknowledgments of deeds,4 and of contracts for the Eale of
land.5 These proceedings, like actions to remove a cloud to title,6 to set aside
a deed for fraud,7 and to foreclose a mortgage on land,8 are said to permit
constructive service on a non-resident defendant since the status of land, 'which
is within the jurisdiction of the court, is primarily in issue.9 Constructive
service on a non-resident is also allowed in suits for the reformation of written
instruments not concerned with land when there is a res within the court's
jurisdiction, and the substantive rights of the defendant are considered not
to be directly affected 1 o
In Cameron v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Inmirance Company,I' a bill was
brought in the New Jersey Court of Chancery to reform an insurance policy
by substituting the plaintiff as beneficiary. At the time of the action, the insured
having died, an interpleader suit to determine the rights of the claimants to
the proceeds of the policy was pending in the federal court in Pennsylvania.
The New Jersey court in the reformation suit allowed service by publication
on the non-resident designated beneficiary, partially on the ground that the
policy itself, being in the state, constituted the essential 'cs which accorded the
court jurisdiction over the defendant. By this reasoning, the court distinguished
the earlier case of McBride v. Garland 12 in which a suit to reform an insurance
policy and to direct payment of the proceeds to the plaintiff was held to require
personal service, since the policy, or res, was not within the court's jurisdiction.
A further ground for allowing constructive service on the non-resident defend-
ant in the principal case was based on the fact that her substantive rights would
not be materially affected. The court concluded that a decree reforming the
insurance policy would merely determine its form, and would not be dispositive
of the defendant's rights thereunder; that claim would be disposed of in the
1. Bethell v. Bethell, 92 Ind. 318 (1883); McBride v. Garland, 89 N. J. Eq.
314, 104 Atl. 435 (1918); Rosenbaum v. Evans, 63 Wash. 506, 115 Pac. 1054
(1911).
2. When personal rights are in issue, the action is in pcraonam. Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1887).
3. Corson v. Shoemaker, 55 Minn. 386, 57 N. W. 134 (1893).
4. Veeder v. Gilmer, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 464, 105 S. W. 331 (1907).
5. Robbins v. Martin, 43 La. Ann. 488, 9 So. 108 (1891).
6. Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316 (1890).
7. Adams v. Cowles, 95 Mo. 501, 8 S. W. 711 (1888).
8. Crombie v. Little, 47 Minn. 581, 50 N. W. 823 (1891).
9. When the status of land is in issue, the action is in rcm. Dillon v. Heller,
39 Kan. 599, 18 Pac. 693 (1888).
10. Doepke v. The Christy Box Car Loader Co., 14 Ohio N. P. 523 (N. S.
1913) (promissory note). Perry v. Young, 133 Tenn. 522, 182 S. W. 677 (1916)
(assignment of insurance policy). Such actions are said to be qz='i in rem.
11. 161 At. 55 (N. J. Eq. 1932).
12. Supra note 1.
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pending interpleader suit, in which the reformed policy would be evidential.
13
The court maintained further that if the contract was as alleged in the bill,
a reformation of the policy would not deprive the defendant of any property
right since in that event she would not have had such a right. But in determin-
ing that "the contract was as alleged in the bill," the court would actually
deprive the defendant of a property right, since it would pass judgment on the
operative facts which might have sustained her personal claim to the proceeds
of the policy. Should the Pennsylvania court, in determining the rights of the
claimants in the interpleader suit, accord "full faith and credit" to a decree
of the New Jersey court reforming the policy, that decree would be res adjudicata
as to the facts determinative of the reformation.
If the principal case is followed, a non-resident having an interest in the
obligation of insurance will be forced to appear upon mere constructive service
in an action to reform a policy brought in any state where the insurance com-
pany does business and has agents.
14 A defense in such a case might be found
in the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which deals with the discretionary
power of a court to decline to exercise a possessed jurisdiction whenever it
appears that the cause before it may be more appropriately tried elsewhere.
15
But without this possible restraint, a bill to reform an insurance policy might
be brought by the holder thereof in any state where jurisdiction over the insur-
alice company could be obtained, regardless of the possible expense and incon-
venience to an alleged beneficiary of the insurance fund.
STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS OF NEGLIGENCE IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
THE familiar conflict of laws doctrine that in the field of torts the le loci governs
rules of substantive law, the lex for rules of procedure, frequently makes neces-
sary a difficult distinction between substantive law and procedure., This dis-
tinction has recently been made solely by a consideration of nomenclature. In
Davis Cabs, Inc., V. Evans 2 the plaintiff was injured in Kentucky while riding
in the defendant's taxicab. Suit was brought in Ohio. A Kentucky statute
provided that the operation of a vehicle in the residence portion of any city
in excess of twenty miles per hour constituted prima facie evidence of unrea-
sonable and improper driving.3  Under an Ohio statute
4 the same facts con-
stituted negligence per se.5 In its charge to the jury, the lower court applied
the Kentucky statute and a verdict was found for the plaintiff. On appeal,
the court accepted the defendant's contention that the Kentucky statute was
13. See Abraham v. North German Fire Insurance Co., 37 Fed. 731, 732 (N. D.
Iowa 1889).
14. See Perry v. Young, supra note 3, at 541, 182 S. W. at 582.
15. The constitutionality of this doctrine has been upheld in Douglas v.
New York, New Haven and Hartford Rr. Co., 279 U. S. 377 (1929).
1. For an argument that the distinction is only in attitude see Arnold, The
RB6le of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process (1932) 45 HARV.
'L. REv. 617, at 642.
2. 182 N. E. 327 (Ohio 1932).
3. KY STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 2739 g-51.
4. OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1931) § 12603.
5. See Chesrown v. Bevier, 101 Ohio St. 282, 128 N. E. 94 (1920).
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inapplicable but concluded that the Ohio statute was applicable, and accordingly
affirmed the judgment on the ground of non-prejudicial error. The court rea-
soned that both statutes were remedial since they prescribed rules of "evidence,"
and hence the lex fori governed.
The court's rationale seems to regard only a nominal classification of
presumptions and overlooks the fact that they perform various functions.
0
A presumption that merely shifts to the defendant the burden of going forward
-with the evidence, of course, performs the function of compelling the defendant
to introduce evidence, and then vanishes. 7 However, if from the existence of
facts A and B the existence of fact C will be presumed, the presumption seems
clearly more than a mere rule of evidence to the extent that the existence of
fact C does not follow as a reasonable inference from the existence of facts
A and B.8 When it is held that driving without a license constitutes negligence
per se, unquestionably no reasonable inference that the driver was negligent
on the particular occasion arises solely from the fact that he did not have a
license. The presumption performs the function of adding to the criminal
liability prescribed for violation of the statute an enlargement of the defend-
ant's civil liability. If it is held that the presumption is sufficient to tahe the
plaintiff's case to the jury without any evidence of negligence, the increased
liability, though less enlarged, is no less obvious.9 And if the existence of fact
C will be conclusively presumed from the existence of facts A and B, the pre-
sumption enlarges liability even if the existence of fact C follows as a reasonable
inference, since the defendant is denied the opportunity of proving that fact
C actually did not exist.' 0 In the principal case, under the above analysis, the
lower court's application of the Kentucky statute seems correct. The presump-
tion established by the statute clearly does not follow as a reasonable inference
from the facts and hence, to the degree that it does not do so, is substantive in
nature. -Since the presumption apparently constituted evidence for the plaintiff
to be considered by the jury, the defendant's liability for violation of the statute
was substantially enlarged. The conclusive presumption of the Ohio statute, of
course, enlarged liability to an even greater degree."
Obviously this analysis provides no "rule of thumb" to determine whether a
presumption is remedial or substantive. In each case the court would have to
consider first, whether the presumption followed as a reasonable inference from
the facts, and secondly, its effect. While this method concededly would place
6. See Bohlen, Rebuttable Presumnptions of Law (1920) 68 U. op PA. L. REV.
307, at 319.
7. According to Bohlen, this is the only form of presumption that is a true
rule of evidence. Supra, note 6, at 307.
8. See THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (1898) 315-327; 2
CHA3MIBERLAYNE, MODERN LAW or EVIDENCE (1911) §§ 1085-1087.
9. THAY=R, op. cit. supra note 8, at 331.
10. Text writers agree that a conclusive presumption must be classed as
a rule of substantive law and has no place in the law of evidence. 5 WIMOE,
EVIDENCE (1923) § 2492; THAYR, op. cit. supra note 8, at 318. And see Bohlen,
supra note 6, at 311. See also CONFLICT or LAws RESTATEMIENT (Proposed
Final Draft No. 2, 1931) § 647.
11. It has been held that a conclusive presumption of the place of the tort
must be applied in the place of the forum. Interstate Motor Freight Co. v.
Johnson, 32 Ohio 363, 168 N. E. 143 (1929). See (1929) 78 U. or PA. L. REv.
421. See also Comment (1927) 12 MINN. L. REv. 263, at 271.
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a slight burden on the trial judge, it would protect the defendant from the
exercise of any opportunity the plaintiff might otherwise have to select a forum
with a presumption more favorable to his.cause than that of the loci dolicti.
At the same time the plaintiff would be assured that by reason of the necessity
of obtaining jurisdiction over the' defendant, he would not be compelled to sue
in a forum with a presumption less favorable. From the viewpoint of logic
and comity the method seems preferable to the appellate court's categorical
classification of presumptions as remedial. 12
POWER OF NON-JUDGMENT CREDITOR TO SET ASIDE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANOI!
IN Braun v. American Laundry Machinery Co.,1 the plaintiff, an unsecured, non-
judgment creditor of a corporation which had entered into equity receivership
in the Federal Court for the Northern District of New York, brought an action
in equity in the Federal Court for the Southern District of New York against
the defendant as the fraudulent vendee of the debtor corporation. Alleging
that the defendant had purchased goods from the debtor corporation in viola-
tion of the New York Bulk Sales Act,2 the plaintiff prayed that the sale be
declared void as to the creditors represented by the bill, and that the defendant
be enjoined from further disposing of the property and be held accountable
therefor.3 The defendant's motion to dismiss was granted on the grounds that
the plaintiff had failed to aver a judgment and the return of execution against
the debtor, and that the elimination by state statute of these prerequisites to
equity jurisdiction was a mere procedural alteration without effect in a Federal
Court. This decision repeats the established Federal rule.4
The common law doctrine denied a non-judgment creditor the power to sot
aside a fraudulent conveyance 5 because, under a separate system of law and
equity, a single action in equity to establish the creditor's claim and set aside
the conveyance would have deprived the debtor of his constitutional right to
a jury' trial on the legal issue of the debt.O A separate action in equity to set
aside the fraudulent conveyance pending determination of the legal issue of
the validity of the debt alleged was also forbidden, because it was considered
12. See Comment (1930) 43 HARv. L. REV. 1134, where a contrary view is
urged. The American Law Institute has apparently adopted the doctrine of
the principal case, except as to conclusive presumptions. CONFLICT OF LAWS
RESTATEMENT, supra note 10.
1. Braun v. American Laundry Machinery Co., 56 F. (2d) 197 (S. D. N. Y.
1932).
2. N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW (McKinney, 1917) § 44.
3. Id. par. 3.
4. Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106 (1891) ; Cates v. Allen, 149 U. S. 451 (1893);
Hollins v. Brierfield Coal Co., 150 U. S. 371 (1893); of. Pusey & Jones Co. v.
Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491 (1923).
5. Cates v. Allen, 149 U. S. 451 (1893); Whitney % Davis, 148 N. Y. 256, 42
N. E. 661 (1896); GLENN, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1931) § 90.
6. See Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106, 109 (1891); Cates v. Allen, 149 U. S.
451, 459 (1893); Goldman Commission Co. v. Williams, 211 Fed. 530, 588 (W.
D. Ark. 1914).
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undesirable to allow a creditor with an unproven claim to tie up his alleged
debtor's property.j
Although this doctrine still represents the majority rule, there has been a
tendency to eliminate judgment as a prerequisite to equitable aid.8 The blend-
ing of law and equity has made it possible to have a jury trial for the legal
issue of the debt and to set aside the conveyance in one action; 0 and a changa
of policy has favored the removal of all obstacles to speedy recovery for credi-
tors.' o The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, which has been adopted in
sixteen states," has been interpreted as an abrogation of the necessity of judg-
ment.12 The rationalization of the Federal Court's refusal to follow state policie3
in granting a non-judgment creditor the right to set aside a fraudulent convey-
ance is that such a right is procedural rather than substantive, and therefore
not enforceable in the Federal courts.13 However, where the fraudulent transfer
takes place in a state -which has abrogated the common law rule, and where all
the parties concerned are doing business within that state, but where the fraud-
7. Tate v. Liggat, 2 Leigh (29 Va.) 84, 99 (1830); see Shufeldt v. Boehm,
96 Ill. 560, 564 (1880); Note (1910) 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1, 10.
8. By interpretation of statute: Douglass Cotton Oil Co. v. Alabama Ma-
chinery & Supply Co., 205 Ala. 51, 87 So. 342 (1920); Smith v. Arkadelphia
Milling Co., 143 Ark. 214, 220 S.W. 49 (1920) ; McBride v. Adams, 70 Miss. 710,
12 So. 699 (1893) (statute specifically granted equity jurisdiction to non-
judgment creditor); Citizens' National Bank v. Watkins, 126 Tenn. 453, 150
S. W. 96 (1912) ; cf. Meinhard v. Youngblood, 37 S. C. 231, 15 S. E. 950 (1892)
(the court drew a distinction between "moral" and constructive fraud, allowing
a non-judgment creditor a right of action only in case of moral fraud); Williams
v. Davenport, 181 Ky. 496, 205 S. W. 551 (1918) (statute relating to the con-
veyance of real property); see First National Bank v. McDonough, 19 Ariz.
223, 168 Pac. 635 (1917); Wood v. Lester, 126 Va. 169, 101 S. E. 52 (1919).
9. First National Bank v. McDonough, supra note 8 (if the debt action fails,
the action to set aside the fraudulent transfer necessarily fails too); Vail v.
Hammond, 60 Conn. 374, 22 Atl 954 (1891); De Lacy v. Hurst, 83 Ga. 223,
9 S. E. 1052 (1889); Simonton v. Simonton, 33 Idaho 255, 193 Pac. 38G (1920);
Shirley v. Waco Tap Ry. Co., 78 Tex. 131, 10 S. W. 543 (1889).
10. See American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N. Y. 1, 7, 166 N. E. 783, 785
(1929). For a discussion of Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion in this case, see
Glenn, The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act; Rights of Crcditor Without
Judgment (1930) 30 CoL. L. REv. 202.
11. See 9 U. L. A. 168 (1932).
12. Lipskey v. Voloshen, 155 Md. 139, 141 AtL 402 (1928); American Surety
Co.-v. Conner, supra note 10; cf. Morse v. Roach, 229 Mich. 538, 201 N. W. 471
(1924). Contra: Gross v. Pennsylvania Mortgage & Loan Co., 146 AtI. 328 (N.
J. 1929) (where the statute was declared unconstitutional "to the extent that
it attempts to give the Court of Chancery authority to hear and determine
actions for debt and for damages arising out of a breach of contract, which
power is solely within the jurisdiction of the law courts." Law and Equity
are separated by the New Jersey Constitution, Article VI, section 1; cf. Lipman
v. Manger, 185 Wis. 63, 200 N. W. 663 (1924) (where the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act although adopted by this state was not even referred to and
therefore not construed).
13. See Hollins v. Brierfield Coal Co., 150 U. S. 371, 379 (1893); Pusey &
Jones v. Hassen, 261 U. S. 491, 497 (1923).
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ulent transferee can be sued in the federal courts because of diversity of citi-
zenship, the application of the Federal rule seems an unfortunate contradiction
of state policy.14
In the principal case the plaintiff relied on the fact that the debtor had
entered into equity receivership as sufficient justification for not having reduced
his claim to judgment. On the other hand, the defendant contended that the
debtor's receiver, rather than the plaintiff, was the proper party to set aside
the fraudulent transfer. In answer to the plaintiff's argument, the court de-
clared that even though the debtor was in the hands of the receiver, the plaintiff
still had a legal remedy either by filing his claim with the receiver, or by asking
the receivership court to allow a special action against the insolvent debtor to
acquire a judgment solely for the purpose of setting aside the fraudulent con-
veyance.
Although not necessary to the decision, the court expressed the opinion that
the receiver could not have maintained this action. While it is generally estab-
lished that the receiver of a corporation has no greater rights than those pos-
sessed by the corporation itself, and any defense which would have been good
against the corporation may be maintained against its receiver, it is also held
that the receiver of an insolvent corporation may, in the interest of its creditors,
disaffirm transactions of the insolvent in fraud of its creditors where the cor-
poration could not.15 Whether or not the receiver may so disaffirm depends
upon the purpose of the receivership and the nature of the proceedings leading
to the appointment.16 Where, for example, the appointment is merely in aid
of a mortgage foreclosure, then the receiver has an interest only in the Mort-
gaged property and has no power to disaffirm the acts of the debtor or to set
aside conveyances which do not affect such property.11 Where there is no
showing of insolvency, a court cannot order a temporary receiver to disaffirm
the acts of the debtor.18 But where a receiver takes over an insolvent corpora-
tion for the purpose of winding up its affairs he may clearly disaffirm trans-
14. The New York Bulk Sales Act under which the instant case was brought
provides that a sale of goods in bulk not complying with the provisions of the
act shall be voidable by any creditors of the vendor. This has been interpreted
as including non-judgment creditors. Willi v. Lyon, 131 Misc. 73, 226 N. Y.
Supp. 283 (1928); In re Perman, 172 App. Div. 14, 157 N. Y. Supp, 971 (lst
Dep't 1916) ; Touris v. Karantzalis, 170 App. Div. 42, 156 N. Y. S. 526 (1st Dep't
1915). In view of the Court of Appeals interpretation of similar paragraphs
of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, N. Y. DEBTOR and CauDrTon LAW
§§ 270, 278, 279, in the American Surety Case, supra note 10, as abtogating
the common law rule requiring judgment, the instant case appears in conflict
with state policy.
15. In re Wilcox & Howe Co., 70 Conn. 220, 39 AtI. 163 (1898); Curtis v.
Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9 (1853); Pittsburgh Carbon Co. v. McMillin, 119 N. Y. 46
(1890).
16. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Clipper Publishing Co., 213 Pa. St. 207,
62 Atl. 841 (1906); Porter Co. v. Boyd, 171 Fed. 305 (C. C. A. 3d, 1909).
17. A, B. Leach & Co., Inc. v. Grant, 27 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928);
see Smith v. McCullough, 104 U. S. 25 (1881).
18. A. B. Leach & Co., Inc. v. Grant, supra note 17. The receiver may ask
for a further adjudication of the court to prove insolvency, Sullivan Machinery
Co. v. Griffith, 294 Pa. 422, 144 AtI. 421 (1928).
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actions in fraud of creditors, 0 his power under such circumstances depending
upon that of the creditors. There may arise the further complication that the
receiver represents general creditors who cannot attack the validity of the
debtor's conveyances without judgment and return of execution or levy of at-
tachment.2 0 The receivership, of course, has suspended their rights to acquire
judgments and levy attachments. In this situation, the receiver may set aside
the conveyances on the theories that where the law prevents the creditor from
helping himself, it will enforce his rights for him through his agent,2 and that
a receiver has the powers of an attaching creditor, even though the creditors
he represents have sued out no process.2 2 Where it is held that a conditional
sale contract can be attacked only by judgment creditors, the creditors having
actions pending at the time of the receiver's appointment might enter judgments
and the receiver would then succeed to their rights.23 In the ease of a mortgage
on the insolvent's property, if the mortgage is invalid as to some creditors
represented by the receiver but not as to others, the receiver cannot bring pro-
ceedings against the mortgagee to cancel the mortgage2 Such an action, for
the benefit of only a few creditors, might be a great expense to the estate of
the insolvent, and the cancellation of the mortgage would deprive the mortgagee
of a lien on the debtor's property which should have preference over those
creditors as to whom the mortgage was perfectly valid.2 5 However, the receiver
may sell the mortgaged property free from all liens and transfer to this fund
the claims of the mortgagee and such creditors as to whom the mortgage is
invalid. 26
Thus the receiver of an insolvent corporation can apparently avoid a con-
veyance or disaffirm an act of the insolvent only if such act is voidable as to
all the creditors represented by him. 27 In this respect, the receiver of the in-
solvent corporation differs from a trustee in bankruptcy, who may set aside a
transaction of the bankrupt which was fraudulent only as to part of the credi-
tors.28 But in such cases, under the Bankruptcy Act,20 all creditors share alike
in the recovered assets without the accordance of preferences to those creditors
as to whom the conveyance or transaction was fraudulent.:0
19. In re Wilcox & Co., supra note 15.
20. Id. at 232, 39 Atl. at 167.
21. Ibid.
22. Porter Co. v. Boyd, 171 Fed. 305 (C. C. A. 3d, 1909); Smith v. Orr, 224
Fed. 71 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); Brockhurst v. Cox, 71 N. J. Eq. 703, 64 AtI. 182
(1906).
23. See Rapoport v. Rapoport Express Co., 90 N. J. Eq. 519, 523, 107 AtI.
822, 824 (1919).
24. American Trust & Savings Bank v. McGettigan, 152 Ind. 582, 52 N. E.
793 (1899).
25. Id. at 589, 52 N. E. at 796.
26. Id. at 590, 52 N. E. at 796.
27. Cf. Farnsworth v. Wood, 91 N. Y. 308, (1883).
28. Mott v. Reeves, 125 Misc. 511, 211 N. Y. Supp. 375 (1925), aff'd without
opinion, 217 App. Div. 718, 215 N. Y. Supp. 889 (4th Dep't 1926), aff'd without
opinion, 246 N. Y. 567, 159 N. E. 654 (1927); Costello v. Emmick, 122 Misc.
114, 203 N. Y. Supp. 123 (1923).
29. 30 STAT. 565 (1898) 11 U. S. C. § 110(e).
30. Moore v. Bay, 284 U. S. 4 (1931); In ro Moore, 11 F. (2d) 62 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1926).
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In the instant case, the sale by the debtor corporation to the defendant was
voidable only as to those creditors whose claims had accrued before the date
of the sale.3 1 Consequently, if the plaintiff had filed his claim with the receiver,
the latter could not have maintained an action in his behalf unless all the credi-
tors represented by him had claims accruing before the date of sale.
31. Apex Leasing Co., Inc., v. Litke, 173 App. Div. 823, 159 X. Y. Supp.
707 (1st Dep't 1916), aff'd without opinion, 225 N. Y. 625, 121 N. E. 853 (1918).
